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Background 
 
In recent discussions of the metaphorical aspects of human experience, 
attention is drawn to the way in which we in Western culture conceive of 
language and linguistic meaning.  As Reddy (1979) has shown, language in 
our culture is conceived of in terms of a conduit or a container, a vehicle for 
the transmission of messages (the “content” of the linguistic “container”).  
This “conduit metaphor” is, in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1980) sense, a 
genuine “metaphor we live by”: the conception of ideas as objects, of 
linguistic expressions as containers of these objects, and of 
“communication” as the transmission of these packaged ideas, is pervasive 
in all folk or pretheoretical conceptions of language.  To an even greater 
extent it governs the largely unquestioned assumptions about language and 
meaning in the linguistic theories of the twentieth century, with their sharp 
dichotomy between form (structure) and content (meaning, function), and 
their tendency to reduce speech to an abstraction of what it really is; a 
characteristic example is Roman Jakobson’s famous “Closing Statement” 
(1960), where speaking is equated with “sending,” the transmission of 
signals from a sender to a receiver. 
 This conception may be our culture’s real experience of language, but 
as has often been pointed out, it is incomplete and inadequate.  The present 
paper intends to discuss some aspects of language use where this inadequacy 
is especially striking.  As a background and starting point for this discussion, 
I would like to suggest that the conduit metaphor and related 
conceptualizations result from the unconscious equation in Western culture 
of linguistic expressions with written linguistic expressions, a conclusion 
that would imply that the functions and properties we attribute to language 
are abstractions, based on the functions and properties of written 
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communication in our literate culture.  As far as theoretical linguistics is 
concerned, this is all the more ironic, since from its structuralist beginning, 
twentieth-century linguistics has been “axiomatically” concerned with the 
absolute primacy of speech over writing.  But the failure to “defamiliarize” 
our cultural and professional habits and preconceptions (that is, to make 
them meaningful by consciously thinking about them) certainly does not 
apply to linguists alone. 
 
 
Information 
 
 Very simply and generally, the function of written texts in our culture 
(and hence the source of the conduit metaphor) is the transmission of 
information.  The writer of a text may have a multitude of reasons for 
writing the text, and the text, accordingly, may have as many purposes and 
functions; but stripped to its bare essence, a text is a channel through which 
information of some sort flows from the writer to the reader.  The notion of 
information is one of the most elusive concepts of our Western notional 
apparatus and hardest to pin down.  To a certain extent everything that 
reaches our minds by way of language or through the senses is 
“information” and to that extent the concept is automatically used by almost 
anyone; “information” in Western culture has reached the status of a 
“dummy” concept, universally applicable and applied, and in many cases 
waiting to be complemented by more specific information. 
 The notion of information can reach its generic status as a default 
concept precisely because it is so important:  it specifies what we think 
communication really is, and as such it lies at the heart of our (academic) 
ways of analyzing texts, language, and meaning.  Information as a semantic 
concept in Western culture is strongly associated with knowledge and is 
typically conceived of as something that is maximally meaningful and 
salient when it is new, where “new” can be defined as “adding to our 
knowledge” and therefore not “known” before.  The newsworthiness of 
“information,” furthermore, is typically something that is unstable:  
information is new at first and adds to our knowledge, but once it has been 
“processed” by the cognizing human mind, it rapidly turns into old and 
known.1  The knowledge-based conception of information, with the ensuing 
                                                           
1 From Lyons (1977:33), an authoritative introduction to the issues discussed here 
(authoritative, that is, precisely because it testifies to the assumptions that I am trying to 
defamiliarize): “‘Communicative’ means ‘meaningful for the sender.’ But there is another 
sense of ‘meaningful’; and for this we will reserve the term ‘informative’ and the cognate 
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distinction between “new” and “old” information, has resulted in many 
conspicuous features of Western “informational” mentality.  Of these we 
need but mention the preferred newsworthiness of texts (in fact the first and 
foremost prerequisite for communication at all), the mandatory originality of 
(literary) texts, and, generally, the conception of repetition as something to 
be avoided. 
 Old information may suffer from a lack of salience, we find, but in 
practice the repetition of what was said earlier cannot be avoided.  In 
modern linguistics and discourse analysis, for example, the structure of 
linguistic expressions (from isolated sentences or rejoinders in conversation 
to extended coherent texts) is analyzed as a sensible compromise between 
“new” and “old,” on the basis of general perceptual principles (e.g., Givón 
1979:348-49): from the point of view of cognition, new sensory information 
(a salient perceptual stimulus, a figure) can only be processed against a 
background of already processed (known) visual information (the ground).2  
Similarly, a “text” (or even “sentence”) can only be experienced as 
meaningful when the new information it contains is couched in what is 
already known:3 a text that consists exclusively of “new” information is 
incomprehensible, too much at variance with the reader’s existing 
knowledge, whereas a text that contains only “old” information is considered 
to be dull, predictable, and therefore not worth reading. 
 Without challenging the perceptual and cognitive principle on which 
the modern analysis of the “information structure” in texts is based, I wish to 
question the automatic connection between visual information-processing 
and knowledge, and the association of “old information” with what is 
“known,” perceptually non-salient, and therefore dull: indeed what is 
“known” (and therefore “old information” in terms of knowledge) can be 
highly  salient in terms of perception.   The concept of information, I 
                                                                                                                                                                               
expressions ‘information’ and ‘inform.’  A signal is informative if [...] it makes the 
receiver aware of something of which he was not previously aware.  ‘Informative’ 
therefore means ‘meaningful to the receiver.’  If the signal tells him something he knows 
already, it tells him nothing”  (emphasis added). 
 
2 See for example Krech et al. 1974:264:  “As we look at the parts of any 
differentiated field, we notice that almost invariably one part (the figure) stands out 
distinctively from the rest (the ground).” 
 
3 Notice that “focus,” a term that is widely used in linguistics to refer to that part 
of sentence that contains the “new information,” derives from the domain of vision and 
perception. 
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suggest, is grossly underspecified, in that it is indiscriminately applied to 
both perception and knowledge. 
 A more cautious and precise use of the term is suggested by the 
dynamics and complexities of speech, ordinary everyday speech in general, 
and the speech of oral epic traditions in particular.  I believe that the notion 
of information and its “transmission,” and the distinction between “old” and 
“new” information, being essentially based on written communication, does 
not do full justice to these complexities.  Furthermore, I believe that the 
notion of information, being based on written communication in our culture 
(transfer of knowledge), is anachronistic, or inappropriate, when applied to 
written texts in older, or other, cultures than our own.  Let us first turn to 
speech. 
 
 
Activation 
 
 In actual speech-events, information need not be new to be 
effective—in fact, effective speech need not be information at all in the 
sense that new knowledge is transmitted to a hearer.  Speakers do much 
more than just transmit new information to one another, and the speaker 
whose conversational skills do not go beyond the “informative” level is the 
ultimate bore.  What speakers (socially behaving humans) are typically 
concerned with is not attacking each other with new information, but with 
what has been called interpersonal involvement, a state of mutual rapport 
between humans that is to a large extent tied up with their language behavior 
(e.g., Tannen 1989:9-35).  Contrary to what (most) linguists and 
philosophers claim, what speakers typically say (or do) is not the assertion of 
facts or the expression of beliefs, but in the first place either a symptom of 
the mutual involvement they have reached with their addressee, an attempt 
to reach it, or (in less felicitous cases) an attempt to hide the lack of it.  Thus 
it is the notion of involvement, more than anything else, that embodies the 
inherent unity of the typical speech event, and that has gotten lost in our 
literacy-dominated conceptions of communication, with their characteristic 
segregation between writer and reader, writer and world referred to, text and 
world, form (“container”) and content (message). 
 As far as involvement and rapport are concerned, anything is 
permitted, even saying things that have to be categorized in the conceptual 
system of Western informational semantics as “old” information and 
therefore dull.  Speakers may even debase themselves to the point of saying 
the same thing twice, or using idioms, prefabs, and formulas that are in all 
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respects modeled on previous speech, the logician’s ultimate horror and 
seemingly the apex of meaninglessness.  What matters to speakers, however, 
is the establishment of a common ground, which consists of their minds and 
those of their listeners being set on the same topic.  It is this involvement 
that makes speech coherent and meaningful, not as information, but, much 
more essentially, as an instance of human behavior.4 
 Interpersonal involvement is not just a social phenomenon; it is in the 
first place a matter of consciousness and experience.  Speaking as a 
cognitive process means, in the perspective of the linguist Wallace Chafe 
(e.g., 1987; in press), the focusing of a speaker’s consciousness on a given 
idea, and the subsequent turning of this piece of conscious experience into 
observable sound, or speech.  Focusing on an idea means that this idea is 
active in the speaker’s consciousness.  The activation of a concept in order 
for it to be turned into speech is obviously not a solipsistic, private affair: the 
very point of the activation is that the same, or a sufficiently similar, idea is 
activated in the listener’s consciousness, irrespective (and this is important) 
of whether it is judged to represent information that is new to him or her.  
What matters in speech is not whether something is new or old information 
(knowledge) but the dynamic cognitive process of activation, the appearance 
in the speaker’s and listener’s consciousness of an idea out of inactivity. 
 We see, then, that beside the usual dichotomy between “old” and 
“new” information, a new distinction begins to emerge, that between active 
and inactive concepts.5  The active-inactive distinction does not necessarily 
supplant the new-old distinction: in “involved” discourse, too, people add 
things to each other’s knowledge, obviously.  But the new distinction is an 
essential addition, in that it can be very meaningful for “old information” to 
be active in people’s minds, or to become active.  The new distinction has a 
totally different experiential load (or perhaps we should say that it has an 
experiential load at all),  which ultimately amounts to the distinction 
                                                           
4 For a similarly “anti-informational” approach to human speech behavior, see 
Smith (1978:85ff.).  Instead of “involvement,” however, Smith uses a less altruistic 
concept to characterize general human speech behavior: manipulation and power (“We 
perform verbal acts as well as other acts, that is, in order to extend our control over a 
world that is not naturally disposed to serve our interests” [85]). 
 
5 I have to add here that Chafe’s conception of “activation” is more elaborate and 
sophisticated than would appear from the necessarily sketchy presentation in this article.  
For one thing, Chafe distinguishes three states for a given piece of “information”: active, 
inactive, and the intermediate state of being accessible.  (See Chafe 1987; in press, ch. 6). 
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between present and absent: what is active in both the speaker’s and 
listener’s mind is present in a real sense, as a shared experience and thereby 
a source of involvement; what is inactive, on the other hand, is absent, out of 
the perceptual and experiential scope of the speech participants. 
 After this short discussion of involvement, consciousness, and 
activation in ordinary speech, let us now turn to an oral epic tradition, 
specifically the Homeric tradition of ancient Greek epic. 
 
 
Re-enactment 
 
 Epic in societies that are not, or not yet, governed by literacy and 
information, like ours, is obviously not just “poetry,” in the sense of a 
literary genre; it is not even oral poetry, for the simple reason that this term 
suggests a special type of what we think is poetry, that is, written poetry (see 
Nagy 1990a:18), and thereby reveals a literate bias.  Rather, and from the 
point of view of the epic singer and his audience, epic is speech par 
excellence, a strong intensification of the cognitive features (including the 
imagination) and social dynamics of the ordinary spoken word.6 
 To begin with, an oral epic, like the Iliad, in its essential quality of 
speech and performance, is activation in the full sense of the term, a 
dynamic appearance out of absence.7  The epic performance can be 
considered as the  re-enactment of an  event sequence that is crucial enough 
to be foundational for the collective experience of the community.  More 
than that,  the re-enactment of the epic story is a reactivation,  a re-creation 
of the epic past in the here and now of the performance shared by the 
performer and his audience.  The reactivation of the epic in performance 
creates a strong overarching sense of involvement in which the entire 
community participates, by the simple fact that the re-enacted, reactivated 
epic world and its heroic and dramatic features are in everyone’s mind 
during the performance, a collective psychic state for which there is ample 
                                                           
6 For the reversed argument concerning speech and poetry, see Friedrich 1986, 
who argues that all ordinary language is inherently intensely poetic, a basis on which he 
states that “poetry” is where language reaches its most typical expression, its 
“quintessence of linguistic form” (27).  Both arguments, to be sure, amount to one and 
the same thing, in that the boundary between “poetry” and “speech” is not a clear-cut 
one. 
 
7 It has to be stated at this point already that this performance quality is 
independent from whether a written text of the Iliad exists or not; see further below. 
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evidence in classical sources.8 
 Speech in general is always modeled on previous speech, without 
being felt as repetitious by speakers.  For grammar, we have to notice, is a 
traditional vehicle, and tradition consists in the re-instantiation 
(reactivation, re-creation) of a given token, rather than in the repetition of 
any “first” (normative, original) token.9  Similarly, the speech of the epic re-
enactment is always modeled on previous re-enactments.  This means that as 
far as the collective experience of the community is concerned, an epic 
performance is never the first one in a series, a totally “original” enterprise, 
in the Romantic (and equally Western) sense of poetic creation ex nihilo.  
But it also means that the epic re-enactment is in no way “secondary” with 
respect to any “original” predecessor: like language itself, traditional epic is 
a re-creation each time it is performed, rather than a mere repetition (e.g., 
Foley 1991:56-57) and this applies to the numerous formulaic “repetitions” 
within the epic no less than to the epic story as a whole. 
 If epic, in its essential quality of speech, intensifies ordinary speech, 
then it should also increase the problems related to the notion of 
“information” as a means to characterize language behavior and 
“communication.”  From the fact that the epic performance is never the first 
one, it follows, obviously, that the audience knows beforehand what will be 
re-enacted in the performance (a simple point that has been made numerous 
times for many epic traditions).  In terms of knowledge and “informational 
semantics,” therefore, the Iliad is definitely old information, lacking to a 
                                                           
8 The classic statement on the irrational aspects of the public performance is of 
course Havelock 1963.  One of the more accessible ancient sources is Plato’s Ion, a short 
dialogue dealing with the pro and contra of the art of the rhapsode (the professional 
performer of [Homeric] poetry).  In general, the ancient rhetorical tradition abounds with 
remarks on the effects that language (or better its user) can produce on a listener, remarks 
that testify to the predominantly performance-based view of language in antiquity (even 
late antiquity) as opposed to our own text-dominated conceptions. 
 
9 The insight that “repetition” (or re-instantiation, formulaicity, idiomaticity) is 
crucial, not incidental, to grammar and speech is gaining ground in modern linguistics.  
Central here is the awareness of “routinization” as a pervasive feature of speech: a given 
expression may prove so useful as a method of coping with a given recurrent speech 
situation that it becomes standardized, and the model of future expressions to be uttered 
under similar circumstances.  This process of what the linguist Paul Hopper (1988) calls 
grammaticalization reaches its strongest form in idioms and formulaic rejoinders, that is, 
in  precisely the type of expression that defies grammatical analysis in “traditional” 
structuralist theory.  In a wider perspective, the insight that language is modeled on 
previous language is crucial in the work of Bakhtin. 
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very large extent what in modern terms would be the newsworthiness and 
salience of new information that adds up to our knowledge-base.  This 
applies in any case to the global level of the “plot” of the epic, but probably 
also to lower-level events, like individual killings in battle narrative (though 
not necessarily to all), and it applies most certainly to the characters, even 
the minor ones, in the epic story.  To take a simple example, the death of 
Achilles’ friend Patroklos, the turning-point in the plot of the Iliad, is, in 
terms of information, known and “old”; at any rate, it is known that 
Patroklos will die, and his death is anticipated numerous times in the 
preceding parts of the Iliad.  Patroklos’ death is indeed very different from 
the sudden and unexpected finding of a new body in P. D. James or a Tony 
Hillerman mystery novel, the ultimate in carefully introduced new 
information in written fiction. 
 But that does not mean that the death of Patroklos is less moving or 
effective in the story of the Iliad.  On the contrary, Patroklos’ death and its 
anticipation is effective, not as information that was not known before, but 
as an experience experienced again.  Just as the skillful manipulation of new 
information in the modern mystery novel is highly typical of our 
information-craving literate culture, so we may say that anticipation of the 
reactivation/re-enactment of what is “known” is the quintessence of verbal 
experience in an oral society, where “new” is associated with appearance 
and activation in the experiential here and now, rather than with knowledge 
and information.  Something need not be “new information” to be effective, 
and much that is old information in terms of knowledge is highly salient in 
terms of perception.10  It seems to be useful, then, to question the automatic 
extension of the notion of information from knowledge to perception; and as 
far as (Homeric) epic is concerned, it may even be preferable to abandon the 
concept altogether and to use conceptual categories that seem to be more 
suitable for the analysis of speech: qua information, the Iliad is dull, qua re-
enactment, however, it is thrilling. 
 But the notion of activation is not limited to re-enactment in 
performance and the continuous salience of successive re-creations of an 
epic; it is also associated with remembrance, and this brings me to what I 
call the poetics of fame. 
 
 
                                                           
10 Experiments in cognitive psychology have also confirmed that even in the case 
of the experience of stories whose outcome should be transparent to subjects, “suspense” 
is by no means ruled out; see Gerrig 1989 (I owe this reference to David C. Rubin.) 
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Preservation 
 
 The repeated mentioning of a hero in an epic tradition is much more 
than the mere repetition of a name.  Mentioning a hero, especially with one 
or more epithets added to his name, is a re-instantiation of the concept of 
this hero, a small-scale re-enactment within the encompassing framework of 
the epic re-enactment as a whole.11  Repeated mention of a hero is not just 
the activation and reactivation of the idea of a person in the performer’s and 
the listeners’ minds; rather, it is the repeated activation of the theme that the 
concept of the hero represents.12  This “theme” is conjured up (activated) by 
each new mentioning of the hero in question, not only in the current 
performance but also in all the other re-enactments of the same epic, or of 
other epics in which the hero also occurs.13  The result of repeated mention 
is a continuous state of activation (in the consciousness of members of the 
community and of the community as a whole) of the idea of the hero and the 
themes (indeed stories, epics) associated with it.  This state of activation is 
the glory that poetry can confer: repeated mention establishes a hero’s fame, 
or, in the Greek term, his kleos.14 
 A hero mentioned with any frequency is rescued from the 
forgetfulness that results from inactivity and absence from people’s 
consciousness.  He is present, not only privately in the individual minds of 
the poet and the members of the audience during the performance, as a 
consequence of their being involved in it,  but also publicly in the 
community as a whole, not only as it witnesses and experiences the 
                                                           
11 Cf. also Foley’s (1991) notion of “traditional referentiality” as a metonymic 
concept: a given token contracts a pars pro toto relation with the traditional idea of which 
it is an instantiation. 
 
12 On the connection between “theme” and the traditional epithet attached to a 
hero’s name, see Nagy 1990b:23. 
 
13 The paradigm example here is Odysseus’ epithet polutlas [“much-suffering”], 
which is associated with the theme of Odysseus’ homecoming (nostos), but which is 
added to Odysseus’ name throughout the Iliad, that is, where events are related that 
happened, chronologically, before Odysseus’ nostos.  In Nagy’s words (1990b:23): “The 
Iliad is recording the fact that Odysseus already has an Odyssey tradition about him.” 
 
14 In what follows I have no intention to add to the extensive discussions that 
Nagy (e.g., 1979; 1990a) has devoted to kleos in early Greek poetry; my aim is merely to 
provide a motivation for kleos in terms of the dynamics of speech. 
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performance, but also in between performances, during everyday life.  In 
other words, as a real compensation for physical death, he is immortal in a 
sense, due to the power of speech, a compensation that is termed kleos 
aphthiton (“imperishable fame”).15 
 You get kleos aphthiton when people just talk about you, an index of 
the fact that you are an idea that is easily activated in people’s minds.16  This 
state of continuous near-presence, the very opposite of the undesirable 
condition of being forgotten, has to be fed by a continuous series of 
activations (mentions) in public performance.  The singers in these 
performances are in a real sense “ministers of kleos”; it is their skill in 
transforming activated and reactivated concepts into effective special speech 
that makes them the collective memory of their community, and as such they 
are in close contact with the divine.  In fact, it is the daughters of 
Mnemosyne (“Remembrance”), the Muses, who have to be invoked by the 
poets.  These invocations, it must be noted, tend to occur when the poet is 
concerned with exhaustive and/or exact mentioning, for example when it 
comes to the presentation of lists (or catalogues) of chieftains, including 
their epithets, biography, and genealogy, that is, the fullest re-instantiation of 
their tradition that is possible within the framework of the full-length re-
instantiation of another hero’s tradition (Achilles’ tradition in the case of the 
Iliad).  
 It is the Muse, an external personification of mental faculties like 
memory and imagination in the psychology and poetics of archaic Greece, 
who stands at the basis of activation and remembrance in the poet’s mind 
and who in that capacity is a safeguard against forgetfulness, and eventually 
absence and death.   What is activated is saved from Lêthê (“Forgetting”) 
and is thus a-lêthês (“free from Lêthê”), an adjective that in later Greek 
comes to mean “true.”17  The truth of epic tradition, however, is very far 
removed from the philosopher’s notion of true and false statements: what is 
                                                           
15 E.g., Nagy 1979:117-19; 1990a:201-4; 225-27; on compensation, Nagy 1979; 
1990a:151. 
 
16 Chafe would call this “accessible,” an activation-state in between “active” and 
“inactive” (see also note 5 above).  But whereas in Chafe’s data ideas are most often 
“accessible” because of previous mention within the same discourse, in the case of the 
epic tradition, ideas are continuously accessible (e.g. “Achilles”) because of recurrent 
mention in previous discourses. 
 
17 On Lêthê (“oblivion,” “forgetting”), Mnêmosunê (“remembrance”), and 
alêtheia (“truth”), see Nagy 1990a:58-60. 
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true in the epic tradition is what is active and thereby “present” or easily 
activated and thereby “near.”  Even more importantly, “true” is what is 
preserved by being repeatedly and officially active in the ongoing series of 
epic performances.  The epic tradition, then, is concerned above all with 
preservation, preservation through activation as a recurrent process that is 
strongly grounded in the dynamics of speech. 
 
 
The  Interdependence of Text and Performance 
 
 The poetics of fame is thus quintessentially oral, but I wish to 
emphasize that the fame scenario I have been describing is by no means 
incompatible with the existence of a written text.  It has sometimes been 
stated, and very often it has been tacitly assumed, that everything that is 
characteristic of an oral tradition is lost irretrievably the very moment the 
tradition gets written down.  This proves quite wrong and another example 
of the treacherous ways in which we Western academics are stuck with 
certain one-sided and culture-bound preconceptions concerning language, 
meaning, and, above all, texts.18  The crucial connotation that comes with the 
concept of “text” was discussed above in terms of “information” and 
knowledge: a text in our culture is something that has to be read by 
someone, and furthermore, we like to think of this reading as something that 
makes sense—what we read as literate beings should be “informative,” or 
otherwise we are wasting our time on known information.  In short, we 
conceive of texts in terms of the transmission of what is new information to 
a reader. 
 The production of texts in archaic Greece, however, was not 
concerned with new information; in fact, it was not even concerned with 
readers at all in the sense in which Western culture speaks of “readers.”  
Whoever produced a text in, say, the seventh century B.C. was not 
concerned with what we would call the expression or communication of 
ideas:  if he wanted to “express” or to “communicate,” he would not have 
known how to do so in writing; maybe he would not even have realized that 
one can use writing for these purposes at all.  Writing was instead an act of 
                                                           
18 Of interest here is the insight that is being developed and elaborated upon in 
medievalist circles to the effect that “orality” and “literacy” are not antonyms, but rather 
blend with each other in various ways.  The key concept here is represented by Zumthor’s 
term “vocality” (vocalité), meant to characterize the essential voice and speech quality of 
(early) medieval poetry in performance.  The fullest discussion of “vocality” to date is 
Schaefer 1992. 
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fixation, the codification of what is “known” already.  The physical result of 
this fixation, the written text, be it an inscription on stone or pottery, or signs 
on papyrus or wood, can be seen as a representation, a substitute of the 
activity that led up to its existence, and this activity is nothing other than 
speech.  The necessary authoritativeness of this speech—casual speech is not 
worth recording—inevitably lent authoritativeness to the representation of 
this speech as text.  Inscriptions, for example, were not meant to be, nor used 
as, bearers of information, to be read by passers-by; rather, these texts served 
the purpose of embodying the authority of the original statement.19 
 Who writes in Archaic Greece, then, is concerned not with the 
transmission of messages to readers (the text being a container for these 
contents), but with the fixation, and thereby the preservation, of what binds 
container and content together into an indissoluble whole, that is, speech.  
Similarly “reading” a text that is meant to represent (authoritative) speech is 
very different from processing information and adding it to one’s 
knowledge-base.  If a text owes its existence to the authority of a (public) 
statement, then “reading” the representation of this statement is nothing 
other than the re-enactment of it, or better its reactivation.20  It appears, then, 
that the usual distinctions between “speaking” and “writing” and “writing” 
and “reading” begin to break down: if speaking is a matter of cognition, of 
the activation of ideas in one’s consciousness, as was stated above, then 
“reading” is a matter of the “re-cognition” and reactivation of these same 
ideas, both in the reader’s and in the listeners’ consciousness.21  Writing and 
reading, in short, are related to each other as performance and re-
performance. 
 This applies, I suggest, with full force to the writing of the Iliad.  
Whoever did this, or gave orders for it to happen, did not thereby turn the 
                                                           
19 Cf. Thomas 1989:46-48, 60-61.  See also Havelock’s conception of inscriptions 
as documents of a “craft literacy,” “in which the public inscription is composed as a 
source of referral for officials and as a check upon arbitrary interpretations” (1963:39, 
53n7).  For “early” manuscripts in general and their use, see Clanchy 1979. 
 
20 See the interesting discussions of Svenbro (1988), who connects the reading of 
inscriptions in archaic and classical Greece with Nagy’s ideas on kleos (the voice of the 
reader being an instrument in the preservation and distribution of kleos). 
 
21 I owe the play on cognition and recognition to the meaning of one of the Greek 
verbs for “reading”:  anagignôskein (“to know again,” “recognize”); see Svenbro 
1988:30, 183-84, Nagy 1990a:171. 
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Greek epic tradition into literary communication in our sense; nor did he 
intend to abolish the public performance tradition of the Homeric epics.  On 
the contrary, he wanted to secure this tradition by regulating the ongoing 
flow of performances and supplying them with a firm basis, in the form of a 
written, authoritative, text.  The writing of the Iliad did not constitute the 
“first” literary text, with a strong footing in the oral tradition; nor did it 
constitute the often mentioned “culmination” (as well as “end point”) of the 
epic tradition, in the form of a “last” epic performance.  The writing of the 
Iliad was not a “literarification” of an oral tradition, unless one sees this 
process as indissolubly connected with the “oralification” of a text.  The 
original text was meant to represent the Iliad in its essential quality of 
speech and performance, and to be as such a normative model for re-
enactment.  As the fixation of an ideal performance, the original text of the 
Iliad was an attempt (successful we may say!) to establish a canon, a means 
to exert power over future performances in the Homeric tradition.22 
 The writing of the Iliad, then, is necessarily linked up with what is 
obviously most crucial about an epic tradition: speech.  Instead of killing the 
epic tradition, the writing of the Iliad actually reinforced it, by strengthening 
the already strong mutual bond between the two interrelated concepts that 
are more than anything else constitutive of the epic tradition— activation 
and preservation.  If epic speech in performance amounts to the activation of 
concepts (stories, themes, whole epics) in order for them to be preserved, 
then the writing down of the epic tradition (itself necessarily a way of 
speaking already) amounts to the preservation of these same concepts in 
order for them to be activated, an activation that in its turn will serve the 
purpose of preservation, that is, the purpose of epic speech in general.  
“Writing” and “reading” in this scenario turn out to be far removed indeed 
from the sending and receiving of messages and information.  Instead of 
being the segregated components of the modern (literate) transmission-
event, both writing and reading in the epic tradition are a matter of 
performance, the latter being a succession of reactivations of the former, 
which in turn is a reactivation itself in an ongoing series of re-instantiations 
of the tradition.  “Writing” and “reading,” then, strengthen and regularize the 
recurrence that is inherent in (epic) speech. 
 We can only speculate on the exact reasons why the performance of 
                                                           
22 Of interest here is Bäuml’s (in press) discussion of the function of texts in 
Carolingian Christianization politics.  On “canons,” “value,” and “power,” see Smith 
1983.  See now also Nagy’s re-examination (in press) of the so-called “Pisistratean 
recension” of the text of the Iliad, a presentation with which the present discussion finds 
itself in concord in a number of ways. 
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the Iliad came to be written down, and on how “literary” these reasons may 
have been.  Sociologically oriented responses to this question might be 
prompted by Nagy’s ideas on “Panhellenization,” a rising sense of “generic 
Greekhood” in the seventh century, with the ensuing need of common 
property binding all Greek tribes together, like Panhellenic games or a 
“national” epic statement.  From this perspective, the writing of the Homeric 
epics is seen as the result of a gradual textual fixation, a “cumulative 
process, entailing countless instances of composition/ performance in a 
tradition that is becoming streamlined into an increasingly rigid form as a 
result of ever-increasing proliferation” (Nagy 1979:8; cf. 1990a:52ff, in 
press).  Such ideas go against the grain of a philological discipline whose 
very identity has always been the notion of personal authorship, and many 
classicists, I suspect, will find more congenial a conception in which a 
master poet made the most ambitious poetic statement he could make, in the 
form of a written (dictated) text. 
 In any case, the frequently recurring opinions to the effect that the 
writing of the Iliad was an act of volitional poetic expression and literary 
communication have to be taken, in my opinion, with much circumspection.  
Such opinions, if anything, testify to how difficult it is to get rid (or even 
become aware) of our academic preconceptions regarding language, 
meaning, and text when it comes to the study of oral traditions.23 
 
The Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C. 
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